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[CONSTITUTION AS of 1949]

642 Art. 15. The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic reserves the right freely to secede from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Art. 16. The territory of the Russian SFSR may not be altered without its consent.

[701] Art. 16a. The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic has its own Republican military formations.

[649] Art. 16b. The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic has the right to enter into direct relations with foreign states and to conclude agreements and exchange diplomatic and consular representatives with them.

[670] Art. 17. The laws of the USSR are binding within the territory of the Russian SFSR.

[641] Art. 18. Every citizen of the Russian SFSR is a citizen of the USSR.

Citizens of all other Union Republics enjoy on the territory of the Russian SFSR equal rights with citizens of the Russian SFSR.

Art. 19. The jurisdiction of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, as represented by its higher organs of state power and organs of state administration, embraces:

a) Adoption of the Constitution of the Russian SFSR and control over its observance;

b) Confirmation of the Constitutions of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics;

c) Submission of the formation of new territories and regions and also of new Autonomous Republics and Autonomous Regions to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for confirmation.

d) Establishment of boundaries, and of the division into districts, of Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics and of Autonomous Regions;

e) Establishment of the boundaries, and of the division into districts, of regions and territories;

f) Legislation of the Russian SFSR;

g) Maintenance of public order and safeguarding the rights of citizens;

h) Approval of the national-economic plan of the Russian SFSR;

i) Approval of the state budget of the Russian SFSR and of the report on its fulfilment;

j) Determination of state and local taxes, imposts and non-tax revenues in conformity with the laws of the USSR;

k) Direction of the fulfilment of budgets of Autonomous Republics and of local budgets of territories and regions;

l) Direction of insurance and savings;

m) Administration of the banks, industrial, agricultural and trading enterprises and organizations subordinate to the Republic, as well as direction of local industry;

n) Control and superintendence of the condition and administration of enterprises subordinate to the Union;

o) Establishment of the procedure governing the use of land, mineral wealth, forests and waters;

p) Direction of dwelling houses and the municipal economy, dwelling house construction and the modernization of cities and other inhabited places; road building; direction of local transport and communications;

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Soviet social and political structure. The ruling Party which has to remain as an organization of militant conspirators in order to perpetuate itself in power, must also rely for the recruitment of its cadres to a large extent on calculating "careerists" and other self-seekers, who identify themselves not with their group and their society but with the holders of power. The main concern of these people is to rise in the Party and State hierarchy. In their jockeying and struggle for positions and favors, these power-oriented people introduce into the Party and into the government an atmosphere of subservience and ruthlessness, rivalry and intrigue, each seeking to rise on the cadavers of his associates.

Just as in the society of steppe warriors, such a ruling group of power-seekers who are not bound by deep moral bonds or ties of ideological loyalty can be kept together as long as the opportunities for self-aggrandizement exist, or as long as there is a common threat to their positions. Hence a cult of hatred of internal and external "enemies," political expansion, conspiracy on a world scale and planned international tension—short of all-out warfare—have become conditions of survival of Bolshevik power.

This situation forces the Bolsheviks to preoccupy themselves with the problems of security, of defense, and of extension of their political power; it prompts them to subordinate the economic production and the intellectual endeavors to these primary needs of their political survival. Such conditions, in turn, make it difficult to satisfy the demands of the masses for acceptance and for a better and more secure life—a situation that tends to deter the subjects from identifying themselves with the rulers and with the State. And it is this aggravating antithesis between the longings of the multitudes and the power-drive of a ruling clique that breeds social upheaval and intensifies urges for destructive aggression.

It is therefore imminent that we think in terms of planned external pressures which might be brought to bear upon the resolution of this gigantic internal struggle before it reaches the proportions of a global war.

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over the whole earth.[1] Through the support of the Church the absolute power of the Emperor became sacred, all-comprising and omnipresent. In the proclamation which announced his reign after he has been solemnly anointed by the Patriarch it was stated that he "proceeded from God, and not from man," and that to him, the "supreme master of the universe, absolute obedience was due from all."[2]

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It was this Messianic ideology of politico-religious proselytism and world salvation which had united the Church and the state that helped Byzantium to solidify its rule and to spread its influence and control over the neighboring countries. In conquered, dependent and friendly territories numerous bishoprics of Eastern rite were established whose function was to obtain the moral support of the people for the Byzantine ruler. The conquered people were allowed a certain degree of autonomy in their internal affairs and one of their privileges was the right of the use of their native language in church rituals.

This politico-religious expansionism, however, had its weaknesses. The only tie that linked the subjected and the dependent peoples with the central power was the Church. Thus, as soon as the central power and the authority of the Byzantine Emperor weakened as a result of internal feuds, palace revolutions, civil wars, and invasions, some petty local potentates saw a chance to emancipate themselves from Constantinople and proclaim themselves as sovereign rulers. Such a local lord following Byzantine traditions would appoint from his own kinsmen bishops and Patriarchs whose function was to anoint the new king, to bestow upon him God-like qualities, and to sanctify his despotic rule among the subjects.

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It is this pattern of Church and state relations that also developed between Byzantium and Russia by the end of the tenth century, when as a result of a political alliance with Byzantium Prince Vladimir of Kiev was converted to Christianity.[3] A Greek Metropolitan and a number of Greek Orthodox bishops were subsequently sent to Russia. Having an eye on the control of all other Russian principalities, the Byzantine Church bestowed upon the Metropolitan of Kiev the authority over all Russian

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territories. He was adorned with the title of the "Metropolitan of Kiev and of all Russias,"[4] a symbolic beginning of Russian religious and political unity.

When the Tartars in the beginning of the thirteenth century imposed their overlordship over all Russian lands, lacking an efficient administration and interested not so much in governing as in tributes, they restored to the native princes their old titles and gave them the right to collect tributes for them. In this manner in the beginning of the fourteenth century Ivan Kalita of Moscow succeeded in obtaining a *yarlyk* (charter of privileges) in which the Tartar Kahn recognized Ivan as the *Veliky Knyaz* (Grand Prince). A few years later Ivan also became the chief collector of tributes for the Kahn in Russian lands.

In his function as chief farmer of internal revenues Ivan practiced extortion from his Russian subjects and acquired a great personal wealth. His riches enabled him to purchase entire domains and apanages, and to buy the protection and backing of the Kahn. Seeing the ascendency of Ivan, and following Byzantine traditions of Church and state unity, the Metropolitan of Kiev and of all Russias moved his residence to Moscow and built a cathedral there, ready to support Moscow princes in their political ambitions.

The expansion of Moscow's power over other Russian lands was favored also by external circumstances and pressures. By the second part of the fourteenth century the central authority of the Tartar Empire, the Golden Horde, had weakened and as was customary in Turco-Mongol society, civil wars ensued among the contenders for the throne. This situation presented an opportunity for power wise princes of Moscow to change their policy of cringing and prostration before the Tartars into that of rebellion and bargain. From now on at times they fought the Tartars, at other times they were again kneeling before them; but they now knew how to take advantage of Tartar weaknesses and how to gain new possessions with Tartar assistance. In this policy of expansion at the expense of other Russian principalities the Muscovites had the support not only of the Khans but that of the Eastern Orthodox clergy as well. Their

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6
WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND RUSSIA'S BUREAUCRATIC AUTOCRACY

I

THE STRUCTURE of Muscovite power had some advantages in comparison with the Turco-Mongol system of rule. The steppe warriors had not developed an efficient system of administration. They depended upon their vassals for the collection of taxes. This practice gave an opportunity to the vassals to enrich themselves, which strengthened their feelings of independence and of revolt. In the same manner the principle of religious tolerance and the practice of granting Church autonomies helped to perpetuate religious, linguistic and cultural differences among the subjects, a situation that did not favor ideological unification and centralization of power. In Russia, on the other hand, a system of centralized administration which followed the Byzantine pattern took care of revenues and of military manpower. The enserfed agricultural population was a source of steady income. Furthermore, state dominated Church tended to Slavicize linguistically and to unify ideologically all subjects under the Czar.

However, this system of Muscovite military theocracy that was efficient in dealings with the Mongols, proved inadequate in Russia's relations with its adversaries in the West. Since the end of the middle ages Western countries went through a series of ideological and economic changes which had fundamentally affected the structure of the Western world. Humanism and Renaissance, Reformation and Counter-reformation, the industrial and political revolutions had brought about considerable intellectual and technological advance and radical structural changes. Compared to the West, Russia had many drawbacks in her economic system. Its power-centered and militarized social struc-

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claimed that the commune should be the main unit of social organization of mankind. In the commune, it was not force or external coerciveness, not the minority or majority rule, but the collective mind, the inner motivations, the principle of unanimity and organic totality that prevailed.[13] It is only by being completely rooted in his own community and completely identified with his own people that man can be creative and can reach all-human ideas, they said.

In such a society in which the state disappears in the Church and in which the commune becomes the basic unit of social organization, instead of external and formal law and authority imposed from above, emotional bonds of unity, self-discipline, informal egalitarian justice and charity will prevail.[13] It is only in such an integrated community which has been fused with the Church and in which the total and organic unity of all members is established that real freedom of the individual can be realized,[14] according to Slavophilism.

Slavophil ideas exerted considerable political influence in Russia and in the rest of the Slav world. Exposed to the growing pressure of imperial designs of Western powers, and embarked on a program of their own imperial expansion in the direction of the Mediterranean and the Pacific, some of Russia's political circles welcomed Slavophil ideas as an ideological justification of Russia's foreign policies. Thus the idea of protection of Orthodox and of Slav peoples,[15] the idea of defense of the Slavs against the encroachments of the Germans and the idea of uniqueness and superiority of Slav culture played an important role in a series of nationalist movements and wars in which Russia became involved since the middle of the nineteenth century.

According to this Pan-Slav movement Russia was the only Christian land, the world outside Russia was "the land of the anti-Christ," the "incorporation of Satan." Accordingly, struggle with the West was not only inevitable, but necessary and salutary, both for Russia and the rest of humankind. And the victory will be undoubtedly on the side of Russia.[16]

For the continuance of its organic life the world required a centre. This centre must be found in a single nation able to

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lead the others. Russia was therefore predestined to fulfill this world mission. Hence the Pan-Slavs looked to Moscow, the ancient Russian capital, not the Westernized "City of Peter" (Petersburg) as the heart of Russia[17] and of mankind of the future—the Third Rome.

15
REVOLT OF THE RAZNOCHINTSY INTELLIGENTSIA (NIHILISM AND ANARCHISM)

I

BY THE second part of the nineteenth century, new changes were taking place in the economic relations as well as in the political and class structure of the Czardom. First of all, the process of disintegration of the old order under the impact of the industrialization and bureaucratization was rapidly coming to an end. Serfdom was abolished and with it there came the disastrous ruin of manorial estates which were not prepared to cope with the difficulties of a money and market economy. The result was that the number of impoverished and pauperized gentry was greatly increased.

At the same time the new laws tended to place emphasis on property. Thus, for instance, in the local assemblies of the noblemen the elective franchise was granted only to noblemen possessing a certain amount of land or a certain value of industrial establishment. This difference in civil rights according to the amount of property introduced a sharp cleavage into the gentry class. Earlier all dvorianstvo and all chinovnichestvo were considered equal in rights and had at least theoretically an equal chance to rise in power or to win the favor of the Czar. But now the new laws disfranchised and declassed a large part of the gentry. Similar laws favored the richer class among the merchants which meant that even in municipal affairs birth and education decreased in value in comparison with wealth.[1]

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one's helplessness, feeling of rejection, and dependence upon the controlling power is especially keenly felt. In such conditions even a slight deviation might provoke a feeling of guilt, need for self-punishment and suffering; it might call for public self-humiliation, confession of errors and pledges to repent and to correct the wrong done, especially when such practices are supported by the inherited traditions. There is therefore a certain degree of truth in the assertion of the Bolsheviks, that "Criticism and self-criticism is a great driving force in the development of Soviet society."[10]

II

In a "prison and barracks" society privileges of power and ideas of grandeur do not sufficiently compensate for lack of acceptance, isolation, humiliations, feelings of insecurity, and sense of inferiority and rejection. In an atmosphere of suspicion, intrigue, degradation, and lack of intimate personal and intellectual contact and of social support, anxieties, fears, extreme self-concern, and deep antagonisms easily flourish. Such a situation tends to magnify feelings of destructive aggression developed on the family level and is therefore likely to become overcharged with extreme hostilities and hatreds; it is likely to become full of potential explosiveness which may be directed against the ruling class itself unless convenient channels for discharge of aggressiveness are found.

In a society in which overt expressions of emotional behavior are under the control of a ruling clique, accumulating aggressions are readily directed against internal and external "enemies" of the regime, be they real or invented for the occasion. In this manner the feeling of hostility against the regime might be redirected against its opponents. It is therefore in the interest of survival of the ruling faction in such a society to cultivate hatred and destruction of the "enemy" by all means of public pressure, propaganda, agitation, education, as well as lawmaking.

These are the reasons why attitudes of extreme animosity against the "enemies of the Soviet Motherland" are propagated in the Soviet daily press and in the school textbooks. Stirring hatreds is one of the main tasks of Party agitators.[11] Accordingly

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in the political philosophy expressed in Soviet writings and in the speeches of outstanding Party members, extreme hatred of the internal and external adversaries is considered as a precondition of Bolshevik victory and of survival of Soviet society. Thus, for instance, in a May Day Order of the Day, Stalin, as People's Commissar of Defense declared: "You cannot defeat any enemy without having learned to hate him with all the power of your soul." In Soviet writings Lenin is hailed as a man who had "a holy hatred of the oppressors of the people . . . "[12]

Just like the Anarchists before them, the Bolsheviks claim that a deliberate cult of hatred is a precondition for the development of a "revolutionary passion." They justify hatred as a means to achieve their revolutionary goals. Following the same traditions the Bolsheviks insist that fanatical devotion should be instilled in people as a means to arouse passionate hatred. Therefore deliberate cultivation of hate together with the training in extreme identification with the Leader, the Party, the Motherland, and the Communist cause must start with kindergarten and with school training of Soviet children. Passionate hatred and passionate love are expected to mutually strengthen each other. According to pedagogical teachings, the Soviet children should be "saturated with irreconcilable hatred toward the enemies of socialist society," as well as with "passionate love of the Motherland." But here too just as in the Anarchist precepts, hatred appears to take the first place and love the second:

> Hatred gives birth to class revolutionary vigilance and creates a feeling of irreconcilability toward the class enemy; the weakening of such vigilance undermines the cause of the socialist revolution. It is necessary to learn, not only to hate the enemy, but also to struggle with him, in time to unmask him and finally, if he does not surrender, to destroy him . . . to vanquish the enemy is impossible without the most burning hatred of him . . . Passionate love of the motherlands breeds inevitably strong hatred of the enemy.[13]

Many outstanding Soviet novelists in their writings emphasize this cult of destructive aggression. Maxim Gorki, for instance, wrote an essay entitled "If the enemy does not surrender, he must be destroyed." Konstantin Simonov, another outstanding Soviet

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of human lives. Soviet military policies are little concerned about systematic rotation of units, facilities for recreation, short leaves and furloughs, regular correspondence with home folks, or with the development of techniques to avoid exposure of men to unnecessary risks.[27] As a result of such attitudes the toll of a Soviet division in war time might come up to 90 percent of its men.[28] Even more indifference is shown toward men who were made prisoners, since "they had surrendered and could not fight any more."[29]

IV

Destructive aggressiveness might become self-destructive unless turned outward. Hence constant internal pressure, intrinsic to Soviet power structure, for aggression against the outside world. A policy of external aggressiveness is likely to provoke external threats against which the accumulating hostilities of the subjects can be mobilized. Successful external aggression is also a convenient way to bolster the prestige of the ruling class and to solidify its rule. The policy of aggression against the outside world implies also the urgency to enhance external security should the policy of expansion provoke international complications.

Early in the development of Bolshevik rule the Communist International and the Communist parties throughout the world have been regimented and employed as instruments of this policy of external expansion, as well as a means of defense against external pressures. It was in accordance with such a trend of events that the Program of the Communist International of 1928, as well as the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International of 1935,[30] emphasized complete identification of the world proletariat with the Soviet power:

> Our road is the road of revolution of the peoples against the oppressors and exploiters. Our will is the will of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. Our goal is socialism for the whole of humanity. Our main slogan is the establishment of Soviet power.[31]

In accordance with such need for outward aggression as a relief of internal destructive tensions an ideological distinction

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has been made between "imperialist war of aggression" and "national and class liberation." The first is said to be an "unjust war" of imperialists, exploiters and war mongers, the latter is a movement of the peoples to liberate themselves from the capitalist yoke or from colonial oppression. It is said that in this "just struggle" of the peoples of the world against oppressors the Soviet Union will unselfishly interfere with its armies to help the people to liberate themselves and also to protect liberated peoples from counter-revolution. It is therefore the duty of the working class and of "progressive-minded people" all over the world to strengthen the might of the Soviet Fatherland as "the center of international revolution":

> Being the land of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of Socialist construction, the land of great working class achievements, of the union of the workers with the peasants, and of a new culture marching under the banner of Marxism . . . the USSR inevitably becomes the base of the world movement of all oppressed classes, the center of international revolution, the greatest factor in world history. In the USSR, the world proletariat for the first time acquires a country that is really its own, and for the colonial movements the USSR becomes a powerful center of attraction.[32]

In order to make Communist parties a tool of this new "Third Rome" ideology all these parties had to follow in their internal organization the Bolshevik pattern of rigid centralism and of unconditional obedience of all the subordinate organs to the higher bodies.[33] Each local Party had to be centralized in such a manner that its leadership was "endowed with complete power, authority, and ample rights" which would enable it to impose "an iron discipline" over its members.[34] All members were expected to accept such centralized Party leadership with absolute power and to "submit to its dictates."[35] This was possible only if "the strictest military discipline" and "unconditional subordination" were established within the ranks of each Communist Party:

> . . . The Communist Party should be organized on the basis of strict proletarian centralism. In order to lead the working class successfully during the long, stubborn civil war, the Communist Party must

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establish the strictest military discipline within its own ranks. The experience of the Russian Communist Party . . . has proved that the victory of the worker is impossible without a severe discipline . . . and unconditional subordination of subordinate units to the decision of those above them, and a strong Party central organ, whose decrees are binding upon all the leaders of Party life . . .[36]

In this manner, the principles of absolute dominance, unconditional obedience and ruthless discipline rooted in the political traditions of Russian society and reinforced by the structure of Bolshevik power were extended to all the parties on which the Bolsheviks imposed their control. In the same manner, also, the traditional filial attitudes of reverence, gratitude, love and humility have been established in relations of these parties to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Accordingly also, destructive aggression became one of the fundamental orientations of these parties. The Communist parties have been encouraged to use all means at their disposal, "including force of arms" in order "to overthrow the international bourgeoisie,"[37] and to "lay low the exploiters . . . completely defeat them . . . crush their resistance. . . ."[38]

As a result, the language of these parties, like that of Bolshevism, stresses hatred, destruction and war. For instance, in the Theses and Statutes and in the Program the emphasis is on extreme hostility expressed in many stereotyped phrases, such as "hatred and relentless aggression," "pitiless struggle," "persistent and merciless denunciation," "merciless contempt," "stubborn, armed and ruthless fight," "fierce and decisive battles," "ruthless war." These means against the "mortal enemy" are said to be necessary in order "to destroy the apparatus of the bourgeoisie," and to bring about the "violent overthrow" of bourgeois power, "at whatever cost." Each Communist party is expected to foster hatred and destructive aggression by all means of propaganda and agitation. The Communist press in all countries and popular Communist songs are especially significant in this respect.

Since the Communist parties outside the Soviet Union, just as the Bolshevik Party itself, stress hatred, pitilessness and destruction, they tend to attract into their ranks people who for one

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It was such thoroughly regimented and indoctrinated Party organizations whose leaderships comprised a hard core of violent and unscrupulous fanatics without bonds of personal or local attachment but unconditionally subservient to the Kremlin, that became a powerful instrument in the international aggression of Bolshevism. Promising Utopias to all disgruntled, rejected and disaffected, such parties became the main instrument of the Soviet Union in its territorial annexations, as well as in the formation of a ring of satellite states. The objective of this expansion was always the same: to turn outward the internal tensions, to enhance the economic, the strategic, and the military potential of the Soviet Union, and to increase the power and influence of the Bolshevik hierarchy at home and abroad.

V

New modifications in Bolshevik ideology were necessary to explain such policies. The Communist parties in the capitalist countries are now said to be unable by themselves alone to overthrow local bourgeoisies or to prevent a counter-revolution after capitalism has been overthrown. These parties therefore need active help of the Soviet armed forces not only to overthrow the capitalist class, but also to eliminate the possibility of counter-revolution and to protect the national independence of the newly formed Communist controlled states—the "People's Democracies." This "liberating" and "protecting" role of the Soviet Army and complete dependence of liberated states upon the Soviet Union is a replica of the dominance-submission and protection-dependence relationships on which the Soviet Union itself has been founded. The dependent states are expected to be ready to defend and protect the Soviets "unconditionally and without hesitation." Such a system of Moscow-satellite relationships is considered so overwhelmingly important by the Kremlin rulers that they demand that their satellite leaders constantly emphasize even in fundamental state laws their dependency upon and subordination to the Soviet Union:

The armed might of the great Soviet Union liberated our country from the yoke of German fascism, smashed the landlords and the capitalistic anti-popular state powers, and opened to our working

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people the road to democratic development. Coming to power after severe struggles with the lords and defenders of the old order, the Hungarian working class, in union with the working peasants, rebuilt our war-destroyed country with the unselfish support of the Soviet Union. Under the guidance of the working class hardened in decade long struggles, benefiting by the experience of the 1919 social revolution, depending on the Soviet Union, our people began laying the foundations of socialism.[40]

To emphasize the superiority of the Soviet Union, its undisputed leadership and dependence of the satellites upon it in the struggle for world revolution, an important distinction has been made in regard to the social and political structure of the dependencies in comparison with that of the Soviet state. Though both are said to be the "dictatorships of the proletariat,"[41] the Soviet state is said to be carrying out the transition from Socialism to Communism; the "people's democracies," on the other hand, are said to be carrying out only the transition from capitalism to Socialism.[42]

Complete political and economic dependence of the satellites upon the Soviet Union is ideologically justified by the claim that the general objectives of world revolution presuppose an industrially as well as a militarily powerful Soviet Union as a base. To this primary objective of all Communists local interests of the satellites must be subordinated. Therefore, any opposition to such plans or any hints that the "fraternal assistance" offered by the Soviet Union in the interest of the revolution might not be completely unselfish is immediately castigated as "nationalism," as "opportunism," and as "treason":

> The essential task, that of laying the foundation of Socialism in Poland, can be carried only in close alliance and cooperation with the Soviet Union. . . . Any tendency to weaken cooperation with the Soviet Union is directed against the very foundation of the People's Democracy . . . Anyone who imagines that the people's democratic state can be formed merely as a self-sufficient body, on a national scale, isolated from the class struggle on an international scale . . . will inevitably sink into the slough of nationalism and treachery.[43]

This system of political, military and economic dominance of the dependencies implies an elaborate system of watching, super-

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vising, checking and controlling. Accordingly just as in the Soviet Union in each satellite country primary attention is paid to the personnel policies. "Department of Cadres" and "Personnel Bureaus," headed by people who are trusted friends of the Soviet Union and advised by Soviet experts, supervise the political reliability and the labor efficiency of all. Observers of these agencies and Soviet experts are at work in every Party organization, every office and every factory shop. The hiring, releasing, and transferring of personnel rests with these bureaus.

In all these considerations political reliability and not professional competence is of foremost importance, a situation that favors the rise of professionally incompetent zealots and careerists ahead of people who are professionally able but more cautious and moderate, or more independent.[44] In consequence, just as in the Soviet Union, there is a keen struggle for positions and ranks and there is a premium on specialists in political organization and violence, a great demand for watchdogs, agitators, overseers and labor-drivers. Unconditional faith in and devotion to Russia is considered, however, to be the first and primary prerequisite for advance in satellite political, military and managerial hierarchies.[45] Hence periodical purges or "verifications" of Party members are undertaken to insure that only sufficiently Russified people remain in the Party.

The need of total control of dependencies dictates also a divide and rule policy among the satellites. In accordance with such policies the Kremlin instigates and encourages local nationalisms, regionalisms and separatisms and external aggressiveness of the satellites while at the same time it must prevent pan-movements and excessive territorial ambitions which might challenge the dominance of Moscow. Thus while instigating Asiatic nationalism the Soviet Union must prevent the championship of the Pan-Mongolian idea by Mongolia or Communist China. While encouraging various Balkan nationalisms it had to prevent the formation of a South Slav Federation.

Another means of promoting effective control of and dominance of the satellites is isolating these vassal countries from the West and therefore preventing any Western influence to undermine Bolshevik rule. This aim is achieved by deliberately pro-

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voking tension between these dependencies and the Western world, and by promoting anti-cosmopolitanism and castigating satellite intellectuals who show pro-Western attitudes.[46] The control of the Church and persecution of Church leaders, especially those with strong Western ties such as the Catholic hierarchy, serves the same purpose.

In order to strengthen this system of total regimentation and control of its dependencies the Soviet Union formed in 1947 an over-all agency as an instrument of coordination of its major policies toward these states, the Cominform. This over-all agency of conformity and vigilance which took the place of the old Comintern is designed by the Soviet Union to bring about a concerted pressure upon any eventual signs of resistance to the policies dictated by Moscow.

The third meeting of the Cominform (November, 1949), for instance, was especially concerned with means to increase "revolutionary vigilance," to detect "deviationism, opportunism, sectarianism" within Communist parties and to wage an "irreconcilable struggle" against all manifestations of "bourgeois nationalism" and against the "provocations and intrigues of the American imperialists." The Communists who did not unconditionally submit to the wishes of the Kremlin were denounced as "imperialist agents and spies," as the "splitters" in the ranks of the working class, as "tools of imperialists," as "traitors," "reactionary nationalists," "clerical and fascist elements," "counter-revolutionaries," "slanderers," "provokers," "fabricators of foulest lies borrowed from the arsenal of Hitler."[47] In this manner the "Party line" laid down by the Kremlin is universally and unquestioningly adopted by all.

VI

The difficulties of control which arise within such a system of vassal dependencies are well exemplified in the relationships between Soviet Russia and Communist Yugoslavia. In the latter country, the Communist-led Partisans were placed in power when the Red Army took Belgrade, but the quick withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the territory of Partisan-controlled Yugoslavia did not allow the Bolshevik Party sufficient time to place

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its own appointees and trusted agents in all the key positions in the Yugoslav Communist Party and in the Yugoslav state administration.[48]

Even during this short stay of the Red Army in Yugoslav territory, the relations between Communist-Partisan rulers of Yugoslavia and their Soviet liberators became tense. The tension resulted from the "haughty attitude" of the liberators and the hostility that this attitude provoked among the liberated.[49] And later when the Soviet Union attempted to infiltrate Yugoslavia with advisers and experts, the Yugoslav officers began "to abuse" the Soviet military advisers[50] and Yugoslav authorities showed such a "lack of hospitality and lack of confidence" that their security organs "controlled and supervised the Soviet representatives in Yugoslavia."[51] The Yugoslav Communist authorities also refused economic information to the Soviet trade representatives and resented the Soviet Ambassador in Yugoslavia collecting information about the conditions within the Yugoslav Communist Party. And when the Yugoslav Communist leaders and their agents prevented the attempt of the Soviet Union to establish a net of its intelligence agents in the country and within the Yugoslav Communist Party,[52] the final break could not be avoided any longer.[53]

Two totalitarian controls cannot exist in one and the same territory. Thus, when the Soviet Union had realized that Yugoslavia was under the firm control of the Yugoslav Communist Party and police. that they could not liquidate its leadership which became too challenging and could not therefore bring the country to a state of complete dependence, subordination and vassalage, the next alternative left was to expel Yugoslavia from the Cominform.[54] A Communist state out of the Kremlin's hold, if allowed to remain within the Soviet orbit, could undermine the very foundations of the Kremlin's dominance over other satellites.

Similar resentment, antagonism, and lack of trust that developed between the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party and the Russian Politburo has always existed in all other satellite states in various degrees and forms.[55] Many Communists, particularly the "idealists" and patriots resent the presence of Russian

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experts, advisers, representatives, and agents occupying positions of power and control in each satellite country, especially their haughty and insulting behavior, constant tutoring and sermonizing on the part of Moscow and need to accept the Kremlin's dictates with humility and gratitude. Also economic exploitation of the vassal countries in the interest of the Soviet Union, the imposition of Russian language and Russian culture, the danger of military occupation and the threat of resettlement of whole sections of the population to Siberian mines and lumber camps, all of these cannot but provoke anxieties, fears, and hatreds on the part of the subjected peoples:[56]

> We are finding out that not only lack of knowledge and ability is displayed in the Czech Army toward the Soviet military science and Soviet war experiences, but that we encounter even a direct distaste and resistance based on hatred toward everything Soviet.[57]

For this reason "Titoism" in one form or another has appeared in all satellite countries. A "Titoist crisis," for instance, took place twice in Outer Mongolia, in 1924 and in 1930–32.[58] In other satellite states the same crises were manifested in a number of "spy trials" and execution of outstanding satellite leaders. But purges and trials do not eliminate the sources of dissatisfaction and hostility. Since the causes remain and constantly generate new feelings of destructive aggression, Bolshevik leaders have to constantly increase measures of security, vigilance, and control in all their dependencies. The Kremlin is therefore increasingly forced to rely on power-seeking careerists, on members of minority groups, on Russian subjects, and on children from dependent states taken to Russia and trained as "New Janizaries" to rule their own countries in a "Rokossovsky way."[59] The patriots and the humanists among the Communists have to make room for violent zealots and cynical careerists, "for such men who would not scruple any means in carrying out the orders. . ."[60] The leaders who fought with their people in underground movements against Nazi invaders have to give way to "a few individuals who spent the wartime in Moscow [and] were installed in a 'Rokossovski way' in the top positions . . . lacking the contact with the population and knowledge of its wishes, they mechani-

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cally apply methods which are in flagrant contradiction to our traditions and incompatible with them."[61] Such policies in turn only emphasize the feeling of insecurity, isolation and mistrust; they cause apathy and a slowing-down in economic and intellectual advance.[62]

In this manner the pattern of Bolshevik expansion which was designed to release and redirect the hostilities accumulated within Soviet society has only extended the area of strains and tensions. The addition of each new dependency therefore adds fresh pressures for more aggression directed outward. In such circumstances the Bolshevik leadership is forced not only to instigate its satellites toward external aggression but also to deliberately provoke and perpetuate international tension. By such means the Bolsheviks expect to maintain a constant external pressure that would work toward unity of the Soviet orbit and rallying of all dependencies behind Moscow.

In the meantime, however, such growth and expansion of Soviet power and Communist fomented unrest could not have failed to provoke increasing anxieties and fears in the countries which consider themselves threatened by Bolshevik advance. War preparedness in the West and formation of anti-Soviet military alliances has been the result. Mutual suspicions and international tension which have developed in these circumstances have increased to a point which has already taken the form of a "cold war" and of scattered localized warfare. Thus growing friction between these two increasingly hostile and aggressive worlds might eventually break into an all-out fighting on a global scale.

On the other hand increasing resistance to Soviet expansion on the part of Western powers might eventually completely seal the outlets for Soviet outward aggression. In such a case accumulating internal complexities and stresses generated by the structure of Soviet power might get out of the Kremlin's control and bring about disintegration of Bolshevism through internal conflicts, especially if these are widened and sharpened by means of planned external economic and psychological pressures.